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This response contributes to Feldman and Turner’s interesting discussion in two ways: 
firstly, it provides some clarity on the definition of the term ‘NIMBY’; and secondly it 
incorporates some of the actual empirical evidence of why people support and oppose 
renewable energy. 
 
Feldman and Turner’s paper is a welcome and valuable addition to the discussions on this 
topic.  Support and opposition to renewable energy developments – particularly wind 
farms – has received extensive attention from across the social sciences.  From the mid-
1990’s onwards, protests accompanying the development of wind farms attracted 
increasing interest.  This early work tended to problematize opposition and sought ways 
to explain and overcome it. 
 
Since then – and particularly following the illuminating work of Maarten Wolsink in the 
Netherlands – academics have moved to more fully explore the reasons for support and 
protest.  Rather than trying to remove opposition, the focus has been on the broader 
context in which people form their values and behaviours.  Rather than decide whether 
protesters are NIMBYs or not, the focus has moved to how categorisations and 
accusations of NIMBYism are used in wind energy debates, and the effect of such 
accusations. 
 
This leads into the first point about the paper.  While it is a useful discussion, it lacks 
clarity about the definition of the NIMBY claims and claimants being considered. 
Feldman and Turner use the term NIMBY very loosely – at times to mean local people, at 
other times to include all forms of protest.  This is not a merely pedantic point about 
language use.  NIMBY is such a notorious and contested term that it cannot simply be 
used interchangeably for ‘opposition’ or ‘protest’ or any other phrase.  Regardless of 
whether opposing a local development is ethical or not, the term NIMBY is not a neutral 
descriptor.  Indeed, in her seminal and widely cited paper, Burningham (2000) argues that 
protesters being called ‘NIMBYs’ is an act for academics to observe, not engage in 
themselves.  
 
Feldman and Turner may indeed be right that philosophers have paid little attention to 
“just what it is about NIMBY claims that is supposed to render them ethically 
problematic” – but they should also be thinking about the label itself before attempting to 
do so.  The term NIMBY can be used to describe selfish, irrational behaviour; any protest 
about a local development; or any protest, regardless of proximity.  Do they mean 
philosophers should turn their attention to all protest claims, just local claims, or just 
those which can somehow be safely classified as ‘NIMBY’?  The ethics of a protest will 
surely depend on which of these is being referenced.   
 
At its most literal, NIMBY is about ‘backyards’, implying very local protest, about 
consequences of direct and immediate effect for protesters.   But Feldman and Turner’s 
paper seems very hazy on this crucial issue of proximity.  There is mention of “genuine 
NIMBY claims” without explicating what these are.  Presumably this is selfish concerns 
about a local project.  But Yosemite is not local for Robert Kennedy; and nobody’s 
backyard stretches for 26 miles, as per the protests about Cape Cod (surely not even 
Robert Kennedy’s).  The point is that some locations – no matter how near or distant – 
are simply inappropriate for wind farm development.  This is quite different from 
opposing something just because it happens to be nearby.  Similarly, as Feldman and 
Turner discuss, people protest because of wildlife concerns or to protect something of 
personal significance, neither of which are irrational and selfish.  This encompasses 
something different than just their “genuine NIMBY claims”, but without acknowledging 
this.  The term NIMBY requires greater clarity in order to determine whether the protest 
it refers to is justified.   
 
Indeed, Feldman and Turner seem to avoid this issue of definition by assuming that all 
protest is NIMBY – whether local or selfish or not.  But it seems unethical to doubt the 
motives of people citing arguments such as wilderness preservation, and suspect that they 
are actually ‘NIMBYs at heart’, merely using these reasons as a ‘cover’. All opposition 
cannot be so neatly conflated by assuming it is all somehow essentially selfish.  Further, 
this is not a task for philosophers or social scientists to engage in, but to observe how 
other actors (such as policy makers, planners and developers) do and the effect this has.    
 
The second point is that a wealth of empirical evidence has convincingly argued that the 
first description of NIMBY – selfish, irrational behaviour by local people unconcerned 
for the greater good – is actually very rare.  Protest certainly does exist, but hardly ever 
on the basis of selfish reasons alone.  Indeed, for a time, many studies were specifically 
oriented to discovering whether the protest was NIMBY or not – and resoundingly 
concluded not.  There is clear agreement that NIMBY is not an effective way of 
describing or conceptualizing opposition.  Since then, it is usually taken as read that 
protest isn’t NIMBY: in a journal article an opening paragraph will mention and dismiss 
the formerly pervasive theory, and then move on to discuss what seems to have motivated 
opposition in the particular case being studied (see for example Jobert et al, 2007).  This 
is not about being ‘friendly’ or critical about ‘NIMBY’ claims but pointing out that the 
label itself is opaque, inappropriate, and unhelpful (see Wolsink, 1994; 2006, 2007; 
Devine-Wright, 2005, 2009; Bell et al, 2005; Van der Horst, 2007; Gray et al, 2005; 
Haggett, 2008, 2009). 
 
Indeed, in contrast to the NIMBY theory, these studies from around the world have found 
that opponents tend not to be stupid, selfish or irrational, but very often oppose on the 
basis of detailed knowledge of their area, the development, and the issue more generally.  
They frequently protest because of the role of the developer, a profit-oriented outsider 
with very little knowledge of the community, building a wind farm without any concern 
for that community, and no tangible benefit to it.  And protest is invariably about the 
nature of the planning and decision making processes.  People (usually correctly) feel that 
they have no say over decisions that will effect them, no meaningful opportunity to 
engage, and that any involvement is merely cosmetic after decisions have already been 
made.  Lack of trust in decision making and decision makers is critical.  Compellingly, 
Gross (2007) has shown that if people feel that the processes of reaching a decision about 
a wind farm are fair, then they are more likely to support that decision, whatever it is. 
 
Further, much protest is about the environmental impacts of wind energy.  While 
renewable energy may be good for the planet, there is often local environmental damage 
to the local landscape, wildlife, and birdlife.  Feldman and Turner have an explicit 
assumption in favour of wind –“we take it as fairly obvious that developing wind energy 
is good for everyone” – but arguments about environmental damage, inefficiency, huge 
subsidies, and the minimal contribution towards meeting climate change and carbon 
emission targets and securing supply are at the heart of many protests.  Feldman and 
Turner state that NIMBY claims are explicitly indifferent to the public good; but 
opponents of wind farms are very often explicitly oriented to what they see as the public 
good – avoiding an expensive and inefficient technology that brings immediate and 
tangible disbenefits to environments and communities.  To assume that wind is a good 
thing, and to judge the claims of those who oppose from this stance is at best unhelpful 
and at worst unethical in itself.  It also means there is a huge gulf between the different 
rankings in Feldman and Turner’s hypothetical model, and very little empirical evidence 
to support the transitions between wanting a wind farm elsewhere or not at all.   
 
To conclude, more clarity is needed on the definition and use of the term NIMBY.  This 
matters for three reasons.  Firstly, it matters for local people – who would not call 
themselves NIMBY and do not “cry NIMBY” as Feldman and Turner suggest.  Secondly 
it matters because there is such a difference between ‘NIMBY’ and general and 
geographically dispersed protest about an issue, and it is not possible to decide whether 
protest is justifiable without knowing which is being discussed. Thirdly, it matters 
because the “genuine” NIMBY, in the sense in which I think Feldman and Turner mean 
it, is very rare anyway.   The wealth of empirical evidence has reached the conclusion 
that selfish, parochial protesters are not the reason why wind farms are opposed.  It is 
reasonable for Feldman and Turner to say that it is beyond their remit to say much “about 
the problem of how to get people to change their preferences”.  From the widespread 
research on wind farm support and opposition the answer to this is in fact clear – if you 
want people to change their minds about wind farm development, engage them 
thoroughly and meaningfully in the planning and decision making processes; and don’t 
call them a ‘NIMBY’.  
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